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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case 
No. 6375 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
Hon. M. J. Bronson, Judge, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Grant Allen Adamson, was charged 
with the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter and after a 
trial to a jury was found guilty of that offense. The 
following are the facts as produced at the trial of this 
ease: 
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2 
Shortly after 8 :00 P. ~{. on August 8, 1940, Karl 
Moulton was just driving out of a drive-in ice cream 
parlor, located on Second West Street between Third 
and Fourth South Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(R. 72, 73.) Two trucks proceeding southerly, side by 
side, on said Second West Street attra~ted his attention. 
(R. 73.) There are four lanes of traffic on this street 
(R. 100) and the trucks were on the two right hand 
lanes. The truck nearest the center of the road was a 
gasoline truck (Exhibit" A" is a picture of it). (R. 74.) 
The defendant was driving this truck (R. 85). The 
other truck was a truck and semi-trailer with timber on 
it. (R. 73, 74.) Moulton followed these trucks south to 
Ninth South Street. While following them he paced them 
to determine their speed. ( R. 7 4, 82.) He checked their 
speed by his speedometer. They were travelling between 
35 and 38 miles per hour. (On direct examination Moul-
ton testified they were travelling between 38 and 40 
miles per hour. (R. 74, 75.) On cross examination he 
admitted that on preliminary hearing he testified that 
these trucks were tra veiling between 35 and 38 miles per 
hour. (R. 80.) He also testified on cross examination 
that it had been some time since he had had this matter 
brought to his attention and that he had testified on the 
preliminary hearing possibly a week after the accident. 
(R. 79, 80.) As the trucks approached the intersection 
of Second West Street with Ninth South Street the green 
light of the semaphore at that intersection was in their 
favor. The truck with timber on it went straight on 
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through the intersection and the gasoline truck made a 
left hand turn to go east on N"inth South Street. (R. 75.) 
:J[oulton testified that he could not say exactly but what 
this truck did slo'v to so1ne extent in making this turn. 
(R. 75.) He further testified that there was absolutely 
no way of telling how much he slowed down (R. 80) and 
that he believed that in the preliminary hearing he testi-
fied that the gasoline truck slowed down appreciably on 
arriving at the corner. (R. 80.) ~Ioulton intended to 
turn to the left but as he crossed the pedestrian lane he 
saw the accident. (R. 75.) He saw some object fly up 
in the air and light on the pavement. It was Sylvester 
Kanon. 
Sylvester Kanon was on a bicycle travelling in a 
northerly direction on Second West. As he passed the 
southeast corner of the intersection he was travelling 
about two feet from the curb. (R. 84.) There was an 
impact between Kanon and the truck driven by the de-
fendant. Officer R. T. Anderson made measurements 
on this intersection immediately after the collision and 
from metal marks and red paint marks he determined 
the probable point of impact as being on a li~e with the 
east curb line of Second West Street and forty-four feet 
into the intersection from the south curb line of Ninth 
South Street. (R. 99.) (These measurements are indi-
<'ated in Exhibit "B," a n1ap drawn by the officer.) The 
ilnpact occurred in the north half of the intersection. The 
I H)( ly of Kanon came to rest 18 feet due east of the point 
of iu1pnct ancl the bicyele :15 feet from that point of im-
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pact in a south-easterly direction. (R. 99.) Defendant's 
truck proceeded east on Ninth South Street 157 feet from 
the point of impact before it stopped. (R. 100.) 
This intersection is a well-lighted intersection. A 
service station is on the southeast corner and one is on 
the northeast corner. The lights of both of these stations 
were on at the time of this collision. Also there is an arc 
light on the southwest corner which was on at this time. 
(R. 83, 84.) 
Dr. Eric Simonson exan1ined Kanon upon his arrival 
at the County Hospital. It appeared that Kanon had 
massive fractures of the occipital and parietal bones. 
these were crushed and loose. The third and fourth ribs 
to the right of the sternum were broken. Blood was run-
ning out of his right ear. There were several fractures 
of the pelvis. The skin was evulsed from the upper part 
of the left arm exposing the muscle. Kanon was dead 
on arrival. (R. 94.) 
An examination of the truck driven by the defendant 
discloses that there was a long scratch mark in the center 
of the bumper having the appearance that it had come in 
contact with metal, the grill was bent and milk was 
spilled all over the windshield and left fender. R. 108-
109). From an examination of the intersection it ap-
peared that there were no skid marks or tire marks of any 
kind. (R. 107.) The testimony of one of the police 
officers showed that Second W e'st Street north of Ninth 
South is 83 feet wide and south of Ninth South Street 
is 45 feet wide. The east curb of Second West Street 
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south of Ninth South Street is 22 feet further west than 
the east curb line of said Second 'Vest Street north of 
Xinth South Street. 
One of the defense 'Yitnesses testified that he 
stopped on the southeast corner of this intersection of 
Second \\Test and Ninth South Street just as the sema-
phore light for north and south bound traffic was chang-
ing from red to green. An automobile was waiting for 
the light to change in order to proceed north on Second 
West Street across said intersection. Upon the light 
changing the automobile proceeded across the intersec-
tion. The defendant's truck was coming south on Sec-
ond West Street. The Kanon boy, on a bicycle, passed 
by this witness going North on Second West Street and 
his attention was next called to the intersection by a 
crash which he heard, and upon looking North he saw 
the Kanon boy going down betvveen the cab and the 
serni-trailer. 
Based upon the foregoing evidence the jury in this 
case found that the conduct of the defendant evinced a 
marked disregard for the safety of others and that he 
was guilty of the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter as 
charged in the inforrnation. 
POINTS IN\TOL \TED 
The defendant has assigned twenty errors. The 
errors relied upon are classified under two headings; 
~-,irst, that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
verdiet; and second, errors were cornmitted in instructing 
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the jury. The State will follow the order these points 
are taken up in the brief of appellant. 
From the following argument we believe that it will 
conclusively appear that the evidence in this case was 
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury, and that 
there was no prejudicial error in the instructions given 
to the jury or in the refusal of the trial court to give 
certain requested instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN 
THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT FIND-
ING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY _OF THE CRIME 
OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. 
Instruction Five (R. 43), given to the jury, sets forth 
in five paragraphs three unlawful acts and instructed the 
jury that if they found that any one of the unlawful 
acts had been committed by the defendant that they could 
take them into consideration in determining the guilt of 
said defendant. These three unlawful acts were: (1) 
Driving at an excessive speed; (2) failing to yield the 
right of way and; (3) reckless driving. It was upon these 
acts that the case was submitted to the jury and if there 
is any substantial evidence showing that the defendant 
committed any one of these unlawful acts and his con-
duct in so doing was reckless or evinced a marked dis-
regard for the safety of others then the verdict of the 
jury must be upheld. The State bases this contention 
upon the fact that the defendant took a general excep-
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tion to the "\Yhole of Instruction Five. We believe that 
there "\Yas substantial evidence on all three of these 
unlawful acts and sufficient upon "\Yhich the jury could 
make a finding of their commission. 
a. The Defendant ·s Speed. 
Section 37-7-16, Chapter 48, Laws of Utah 1935 was 
1n force at the time of the commission of the crime 
charged in the information in this case. It is not neces-
sary for the State to prove that the defendant was going 
at any particular speed in miles per hour. Those statutes 
provide as follows : 
''On all public highways, it is unlawful for 
any person to drive a vehicle upon a highway at 
a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent, 
having due regard to the traffic, surface and 
width of the highway and the hazard at inter-
sections and any other condition then existing. 
Nor shall any person drive at a speed which 
is greater than will per1nit the driver to exercise 
proper control of the vehicle and to decrease 
speed or to stop as may be necessary to avoid 
eolliding vvith any person, vehicle or other con-
veyance upon or entering the highway in com-
pliance with legal requirements and with the duty 
of drivers and other persons using the highway 
to exercise due care;" 
Counsel for the appellant limits his discussion en-
tirely to the miles per hour which the defendant was 
going at the intersection of Ninth South Street and 
Second West or whether or not he was going slow or fast 
\vithont taking into consideration the surrounding cir-
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cumstances. Counsel states that he cannot determine 
from the evidence where it was on Second West Street 
between Third South and Ninth South Streets that the 
defendant was driving between 35 and 40 miles per hour. 
We believe that a fair interpretation of the testimony of 
Moulton is that he followed the defendant from the ice 
cream parlor to Ninth South Street and during that time 
he paced the defendant. (R. 7 4.) We submit that it is 
a reasonable interpretation of this testimony that the 
defendant maintained this speed until making the turn 
at the intersection of Ninth South and Second West 
Street, at which time he slowed down in making that 
turn. The witness testified, of course, that he could not 
tell exactly how much the defendant had slowed down. 
However, the jury could have taken into consideration 
the fact that the defendant's truck was driven a distance 
of 157 feet from the point of impact before he brought 
it to a stop. The jury could also have considered the 
force with which Kanon was struck. This is evidenced 
by the various injuries which he received. The evidence 
indicates that the bones of his skull were crushed and 
two ribs were broken, there were several fractures of 
his pelvis and the upper part of his left arm was severely 
injured. 
As indicated by the foregoing statute, the jury could 
take into consideration the traffic on the highway and 
the hazard at the intersection and any other conditions 
therein existing in determining whether or not the de-
fendant was driving at a speed which was greater than 
was reasonabla and prudent. We submit that t]Je evi-
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dence indicates that the defendant "'"as not keeping a 
proper look-out. The intersection 'Yas well-lighted as 
heretofore indicated. It is apparent that the defendant did 
not see the Kanon boy inasmuch as no skid marks were 
made indicating an application of the brakes to avoid a 
collision. It does not appear that the defendant turned 
in any manner in atten1pting to avoid this collision. He 
just sailed into the intersection, making a left hand turn, 
in the face of oncoming traffic, and after hitting the 
Kanon boy finally came to a stop 157 feet east of the 
point of impact. We submit that coming into an inter-
section, protected by a semaphore light, and making a 
turn in the face of oncoming traffic at almost any speed 
could well be found an unreasonable speed by the jury, 
especially where a vehicle in that oncoming traffic was 
hit by the vehicle making such turn. 
When we consider the size of this truck that was 
being driven by the defendant and his inability to bring 
it to a stop in less than 157 feet, impresses one with the 
fact that going through this intersection as he did the 
defendant must have been going at a speed which was 
greater than was then and there reasonable and prudent 
within the meaning of the statute heretofore quoted. 
One of the defendant's duties was to determine 
whether or not he could make this turn without endanger-
ing oncoming traffic. He cannot be heard to say that 
he did not expect traffic to be coming toward him. De-
l'ense testimony indicates an automobile had just passed 
through the intersection. It was defendant's duty 'to 
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see if there was any traffic coming toward him in a 
northerly direction. If he was going at a speed which 
would prevent him from stopping or turning out to avoid 
such oncoming traffic then his speed was not reasonable 
and prudent. If he was not looking to determine if such 
traffic was coming in a northerly direction then, of 
course, any sped would not be reasonable or prudent. 
We submit this evidence also indicated that the speed 
of the defendant was greater than would permit him to 
exercise proper control of his vehicle and to decrease 
speed or to stop to avoid persons or vehicles on the 
highway. 
The case of Dunville vs. State, 188 Ind. -373, 123 
N. E. 689 (1919) is not helpful to the Court in determin-
ing the question of whether or not this defendant vio-
lated the speed statute of this State. The evidence in 
that case indicates that the deceased, a little girl, ran 
into the street in front of the defendant's motorcycle 
and the defendant was unable to avoid hitting her ... a 
very different thing than making a left hand turn at an 
intersection, the traffic of which is enough to require the 
placement of a semaphore light to aid traffic. 
In the Dunville case it could well be said that the de-
fendant could not expect a child to run out into the street 
in front of his motorcycle. In the case at bar we have an 
intersection collision and the defendant ran into on-
coming traffic which he might well expect to be there. 
Appellant does not think that any assumption can 
or should be drawn from the fact that defendant's truck 
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,n?nt a distance of 157 feet from the point of in1pact be-
fore defendant brought it to a stop. And why not~ 
Certainly upon running into somebody the most usual 
thing for a person to do, if he 'Yas in complete possession 
of his faculties, would be to bring his automobile to a 
stop as soon as possible. ''T e think the jury might well 
infer that the truck 'Yas brought to a stop as soon as 
the defendant could do so. The absence of skid marks 
proves nothing other than the defendant did not see 
Kanon 'vhom he should have seen. 
Counsel cites State rs. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 Pac. 
(2) 943 and asks 'vhat it was that Adamson did or did 
not do that shows that he acted recklessly and in marked 
disregard of the rights of others. The simple answer to 
this question is that the defendant, without keeping a 
proper lookout, made a left hand turn at an intersection 
in the face of oncoming traffic and disregarded his duties 
by failing to determine :whether there was any oncoming 
traffic before making that left hand turn and in crossing 
the intersection in the manner in which he did and not 
being able to stop his truck before it had gone 157 feet 
beyond the point of impact. 
.Appellant contends that there is no evidence that the 
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout. From the 
evidence in this case he did not see the Kanon boy. We 
<'an reasonably infer this from the fact that no effort was 
n1ade by the defendant to stop or to turn out before the 
point of i1npact. The Kanon boy was in the path of the 
<lefenclnnt 's trnrk. We can reasonably infer this from 
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the fact that he was hit. He should have been seen by 
the defendant. We can reasonably infer this from the 
fact that the intersection is well-lighted. The defendant 
had a duty to determine the presence of oncoming traffic 
because he was turning in the face of it. We submit 
there is evidence that the defendant made this turn with-
out keeping a proper lookout. This should be taken into 
consideration in determining whether there is any sub-
stantial evidence that the defendant violated the speed-
ing statutes of this State. 
b. The defendant failed to yield the right of way to 
Sylvester Kanan. 
The statute on right of way provides as follows, 
57-7-31, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933: 
''The driver of a vehicle within an inter-
section in tending to turn to the left shall yield to 
any vehicle approaching from the opposite direc-
tion which is within the intersection or so close 
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, but 
such driver having so yielded and having given 
a signal when and as required by law may make 
such left turn, and other vehicles approaching the 
intersection from the opposite direction shall 
yield to the driver making the left turn.'' 
Counsel for appellants contends there is no substan-
tial evidence that defendant violated this statute. 
Defendant was driving a vehicle within the intersec-
tion of Second West Street and Ninth South Street. He 
intended to make a left hand turn at that intersection. 
This is evidenced by the fact that he made such a turn. 
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The statute, under such circumstances, imposed upon 
him a duty to yield to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction if that vehicle w·as "\vithin the inter-
section or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard. 
Is there any evidence showing that Kanon's bicycle 
came within this statute and 'vas entitled to the right of 
way? Kanon and his bicycle were hit by the front of the 
truck driven by the defendant. The probable point of 
impact was four feet north of the center of Ninth South 
Street and on a line with the east curb of Second West 
Street. T. A. Fowler testified that he looked north, saw 
the truck of the defendant approaching the intersection, 
looked back and Kanon "\Vent by and then he heard the 
impact. (R. 118.) This is certainly substantial evidence 
that at the time the defendant intended to make the left 
hand turn Kanon was either in the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. A 
jury could reasonably infer that both defendant and 
Kanon were entering the intersection at about the same 
time and could find that the defendant, in failing to yield 
to Kanon, violated the foregoing statute. 
Apparently counsel for appellant seem to think that 
if the defendant yielded to the Ford which just pre-
ceded Kanon across the intersection that he could then 
proceed to make his left hand turn and Kanon 'vould 
have to yield to defendant. Under this statute the de-
fendant before making a left hand turn would have to 
.ri(~I<l to every vehicle coming in the opposite direction so 
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long as such vehicle was either within the intersection 
or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
There is evidence that defendant slowed down to some 
extent but that he continued to make the turn. In order 
to obtain the right of way the defendant, in addition to 
the above, would have to give a signal as required by law 
in making a left hand turn. There is no evigence that he 
gave such signal. 
We submit that there is substantial evidence which 
would support a finding that the defendant violated the 
foregoing statute. 
c. The evidence supports a finding that the de-
fendant violated the reckless driving statute. 
The first and second paragraphs of Instruction Five 
sets forth the reckless driving statute (57-7-15, Revised 
Statutes of Utah 1933) and the jury by that instruction 
were permitted to deliberate upon the proposition of 
whether or not the defendant violated that statute. 
The conduct of the defendant in driving into the 
oncoming traffic at the intersection of Second West 
Street and Ninth South, at a speed which was not reason-
able and prudent under the circumstances, without keep-
ing a proper or any lookout and without yielding the 
right of way to Kanon is substantial evidence supporting 
a finding that the defendant violated the reckless driving 
statute. 
The defendant was driving a large truck between 3G 
and 40 miles per hour along Second West Street until 
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he arriYed at the intersection of that street and Ninth 
South at "~hich time the truck 'vas slowed down to some 
extent. He made a left hand turn into traffic coming 
in the opposite direction. The intersection was well-
lighted. From the fact that he neither applied his 
brakes nor made any attempt to avoid hitting Kanon in-
dicates at least that he did not see Kanon. Kanon was 
. 
there, however. He should have seen him. There is no 
reason for his failure to see him unless he was not look-
ing. At least the jury could reasonably infer that de-
fendant was not looking. Defendant was under a very 
positive duty to determine whether there was any traffic 
crossing that intersection and going in an opposite di-
rection before making that left hand turn. This he did 
not do. He just sailed through the intersection and across 
the path of oncoming traffic. The force of the impact is 
shown by the condition of the deceased after the impact. 
Defendant then continued on 157 feet before he brought 
the truck to a stop. 
\Ve submit that making this left hand turn under 
the conditions then existing, is substantial evidence of a 
violation of the reckless driving statute. 
(d.) Defendant's conduct was reckless and evinced 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. 
Under the case of State vs. Lingman, 97 Utah 180, 
91 J>. (2) 457 (1939) in order to sustain a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter there must be not only sub-
stantial evidence of an unlawful act committed by the 
defendant hut therP 1nust also be substantial evidence 
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that the conduct of the defendant was reckless or evinced 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. The trial 
court recognized this rule and the jury under Instruction 
Six was required to so find beyond a reasonable doubt 
before returning a verdict of guilty in this case. The 
jury certainly found beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
conduct of defendant was reckless and evinced a marked 
disregard for the safety of others. 
Were they justified in so finding~ 
What has been said under (c) above on reckless driv-
ing applies to this point now under consideration. For 
emphasis we again say; the defendant was driving in an 
intersection whereon traffic was directed by a sema-
phore. When he entered that intersection the defendant 
knew that north and south bound traffic were to proceed 
through the intersection. To make a left hand turn he 
knew that he would be crossing the path of traffic which 
had a right to proceed across the intersection. He was 
changing his course. His speed should have been such 
that this large truck was under such control that he could 
stop it to avoid colliding with north bound traffic. He 
should have looked to see if there was any north bound 
traffic which would obstruct the path of his truck. It 
was his duty to yield to any vehicle which was within the 
intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard. Defendant obviously disregarded hifl 
duties aforesaid, at least there is substantial evidence 
that he did. He made the left hand turn, hit Kanon who 
was going north, and proceeded on east on Ninth South 
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157 feet. This conduct '"'as certainly reckless, it evinced 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. The jury 
so found. This Court should not upset this finding. 
(e) .Authorities relating to the sufficiency of the 
eridence. 
A reading of the instructions in the case discloses 
that the rules laid down in State vs. Lingman, supra, 
were closely followed by the trial court. The instruc-
tions were given upon the theory that the case came 
under the so-called arm (a) of the involuntary man-
slaughter statute. That is, to convict, the jury must 
find an unlawful act plus reckless conduct or conduct 
evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others. 
This rule for the sufficiency of evidence or the elements 
of the crime of which defendant was found guilty is clear 
and there can be no question but \Vhat the trial court had 
the correct rule in mind. The only question here is its 
application to the facts in the case at bar, or put in 
another way, are the facts in this case sufficient to 
comply with the rule. 
In the foregoing discussion of the facts, we believe 
we have demonstrated that there is substantial evidence 
in the record from which the jury might reasonably find 
that defendant committed one or more unlawful acts 
and that his conduct in so doing was reckless and evinced 
a marked disregard for the safety of others. 
As might be expected the decisions relating to the 
sufficiency of evidence in involuntary manslaughter 
cases are not very helpful as far as facts are concerned. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Each case is decided upon its own perculiar facts and 
circumstances and in most all jurisdictions the court then 
determines whether or not, in their opinion, the facts in 
the record are such that the jury was justified in finding 
recklessness or a disregard for the safety of others. 
We will cite a few cases wherein rules are laid down 
which we believe are applicable to the case at bar. As 
shown by the case of People vs. Smaszcz, 344 Ill. 494, 176 
N. E. 768 ( 1931), it is not necessary that an eye witness 
testify to the speed of an automobile of the accused in 
order to justify a finding that it vvas going at an exces-
sive rate of speed at the time of the fatal collision. If 
an unreasonable speed can be determined from the force 
of the impact, the severity of the injuries sustained, the 
distance travelled after the impact by the automobile or 
automobiles involved, etc., it is sufficient to support a 
verdict based thereon. See also State vs. Bedinger, 126 
N. J. L. 288, 19 A. (2) 322 (1941). 
To have had his car under proper control the de-
fendant should have been operating it at such a speed 
and with such attention to it as would enable him to 
bring it to a stop with a reasonable degree of quickness 
or within a reasonable distance and to guide it safely 
around objects on the highway. State vs. Elliott, (Del.} 
8 A. ( 2) 873. Certainly within this definition of proper con-
trol the evidence was that the defendant did not con1ply 
with his duty to have the truck under proper control. 
He could not stop his truck with any degree of quickness 
or within a reasonable distance. The evidence that he 
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did not stop it 'vith any degree of quickness and within 
a reasonable distance is certainly substantial evidence 
that he could not so stop it. 
People vs. Przybyl, 365 Ill. 515, 6 N. E. (2) 848, laid 
down a similar rule. In that case the defendant passed 
another car going in the same direction that he was 
going and then hit and killed a pedestrian who was 
crossing the street. Apparently the defendant could 
not see what was on the other side of this car as he 
passed it. The court said that he was under a duty to 
have his car under such control that he could avoid a 
collision with any person crossing the street and that 
his failure to do so was an utter disregard of the safety 
of others. In other words, in that case the defendant 
might well expect that someone would be crossing the 
street and that he could not be able to see it because of 
the other car. Since the defendant there could have ex-
pected such a situation the court held that he was under 
a duty to have his car in such control that he could avoid 
hitting a person who might be expected on the street. 
In the case at bar, the defendant certainly could 
expect that there would be north bound traffic as he 
attempted to make the left hand turn. Hence he should 
have had his car under such control that he could avoid 
colliding vvith any such north bound traffic. His failure 
~o to do under the authority of the Przybyl case consti-
tutP<l an utter disregard for the safety of others. 
Another case vvhich applies a similar rule is Cornett 
'OS. CoJJnnornrealth, 282 Ky. 322, 138 S. W. (2) 492 (1940) . 
• 
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In that case the court held that where a defendant was 
driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour on a highway 
and approached children playing with a ball on the edge 
of the highway the ball is likely to get out of their control 
and the defendant should therefore bring his car under 
such control as to avert an accident if a child should 
dart in front of his automobile. His failure to have his 
car under such control would be such recklessness as to 
make the case a question for the jury. 
In the case at bar the defendant did not have his 
truck under the control as required by the foregoing 
cases, and we submit that such being the case he violated 
the speed statute requiring him to have his truck under 
immediate control. 
It is axiomatic that to violate a speeding statute 
such as that in Utah it is not necessary that the accused 
should drive his automobile in excess of a prescribed 
speed such as in excess of 25 miles per hour in a resi-
dential district. Circumstances and conditions may make 
a speed unlawful which otherwise would be lawful. State 
vs. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 175 N. W. 892 (1920); 
People vs. Van Echartsberg, 133 Cal. App. 1, 23 P. (2) 
819 (1933); Mulkern vs~ State, 176 Wis. 490, 187 N. W. 
190 (1922); State vs. Mills, 181 N. C. 530, 106 S. E. 677 
(1921). 
In State vs. Elliott, supTa, it is pointed out that 
the person operating a vehicle must maintain constant}~· 
a proper lookout for persons or other vehicles, and the 
duty to look requires the duty to see that 'vhich i~ in 
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plain sight, unless some reasonable explanation is offer-
ed. It is negligence not to see what is plainly visible 
\vhen there is nothing to obstruct the vision of the driver, 
for he is required not only to look but is required to 
exercise his sense of sight in such a careful and intel-
ligent manner as \vill enable him to see what a person 
in the exercise of the ordinary care and control would 
see under the circumstances. 
In State vs. Biewen, 169 Iowa 256, 151 N. W. 102, 
it was held that where a driver of an automobile has 
an unobstructed view of a person upon the highway 
and there is no obstacle to turning aside to avoid a 
collision and a collision occurs with such other person, 
a death resulting from such collision may be found to be 
a consequence of such driver's recklessness. The court 
held that it made no difference whether the driver saw 
such person or not because if he did not see that person 
he should have done. 
In People vs. il!cKeon, 236 N.Y. S. 591 (1929), the 
defendant was convicted of reckless driving and appeal-
ed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient. 
The defendant was proceeding north on a highway and 
his car collided with a car driving south. Defendant had 
n1ade a sharp turn to the left in order to go west on an 
intersectional high\vay and he hit the car of the injured 
person. The court upheld the conviction based upon 
this evidence and with relation to the defendant's duty 
it ~tated: 
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''Whenever a driver on a highway intends to 
make a left turn, he must take every precaution 
in making that turn so as not to endanger traffic 
coming in the opposite direction, for the left turn 
swings him directly in front of traffic lawfully 
proceeding on the right side of the thoroughfare.'' 
2. NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS MADE BY 
THE COURT IN GIVING HIS INSTRUCTIONS NOR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE CERTAIN REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
(a.) No error was committed by the court in in-
structing on right of w.ay. 
Instruction Number Five contains the instruction 
on right of way and is the paragraph therein numbered 
"Fifth". Counsel contends that the giving of the in-
struction on the subject of right of way was erroneous 
because there was no evidence that the defendant failed 
to yield the right of way or that the Kanon boy had 
the right of way, and for the further reason that the 
entire statute relating to right of way was not placed 
in the instruction. We have heretofore indicated the 
evidence on which the State relies as substantially tend-
ing to show that the defendant did fail to yield the 
right of way and we refer the Court to Point 1 (b). 
Counsel contends that the Kanon boy had lost his 
right of way because of the fact that he violated the 
law in two particulars: ( 1) in failing to have a light 
on his bicycle and ( 2) in failing to keep on the right 
side of the road. It is unquestionable that the evidence 
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is to the effect that Kanon had no light on his bicycle 
but w'e do not believe that as a matter of law the Court 
can say that Kanon thereby lost his right of way. If the 
defendant SR\V him "rould this Court for one minute 
hold that Adan1son could run him down at will or that 
he could take the right of way from Kanon although 
Kanon was then 'vithin the intersection or so close 
thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard~ The 
Court would have to go this far in order to hold that 
this right of \vay instruction should not have been given. 
Counsel also claims that Kanon lost his right of 
way because he violated a city ordinance and a state 
statute requiring persons to drive as closely as practic-
able to the right hand edge or curb of a highway. The 
ordinance by its wording particularly applies to riders 
of bicycles. The evidence is that Kanon was riding with-
in two or three feet of the curb of Second \Vest south 
of Ninth South. He had not driven to the east of the 
line at the time he was hit by the defendant. Counsel 
apparently contends that it was the duty of Kanon 
under this statute and ordinance to drive in a northeast 
direction across the intersection. It is submitted that 
this is not the proper interpretation of the statute or 
ordinance. There was no curb or edge of the highway 
in the middle of this intersection and hence no evidence 
that Kanon in any way violated the law. 
Counsel cites Dixon vs. Berg~in, 64 Ut. 195, 228 P. 
7~~ (1024). In that case the accident did not occur in 
the intersection but in the middle of the block. The 
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evidence shows that the. plain tiff was from 25 to 27 
feet from the edge or curb of the highway. Certainly 
it is not like the case at bar where Kanon was driving 
his bicycle as closely as practicable to the right hand 
edge or curb of the highway. 
We do not believe that the Court erred in leaving 
out the latter part of the right of way. statute, Section 
57-7-31, R. S. U. 1933. The following is the part of the 
statute which was left out of the court's instruction: 
''but such driver having so yielded and hav-
ing given a signal when and as required by law 
may n1ake such left turn, and other vehicles 
approaching the intersection from the opposite 
direction shall yield to the driver making the 
left turn. ' ' 
There was no evidence of any kind in the record 
from which the jury could have made any finding in 
relation to this portion of the statute. Counsel states 
that the evidence is to the effect that the defendant 
yielded within the meaning of this statute and the Kanon 
boy thereby lost his right of way. Of course, there is 
evidence that the defendant slowed down but certainly 
that is no evidence that he had yielded the right of way 
to vehicles 'vhich were within the intersection or so clo~e 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. Another thing 
that should be noted is that the defendant did not obtain 
the right of way until he both yielded and gave a signal 
as required by law to make a left hand turn. Of course, 
there is absolutely no evidence in the record of such 
signal being given and that being true the above quotr(l 
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portion of the statute was properly taken out of the 
instruction given by the court. 
(b.) ~10 error was committed by the Court in re-
fusing tlze requested instructions of the defendant per-
taining to the conduct of the deceased as the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
This point requires a consideration of the rule 
relating to the contributory negligence of a deceased 
person in an involuntary manslaughter case. 
One of the leading cases in this country on this 
proposition is the case of State vs. Campbell, 82 Conn. 
671, 7 4 Atl. 927, 135 Am. St. Rep. 293, 18 Ann. Cas. 236 
(1910). In that case it was clearly held that contributory 
negligence is no defense in an involuntary manslaughter 
case. In that case it was pointed out that the court did 
not eliminate the deceased's conduct from the case. The 
court stated : 
"The court properly said to the jury that the 
State must clearly show that the deceased's death 
vvas the direct result of the defendant's negli-
gence, but that the injured man's conduct became 
material only as it bore upon the question: of 
such negligence of the accused, and that if the 
culpable negligence of the accused was the cause 
of l\I r. ~I organ's death, the accused was respon-
sible under the criminal law, whether Mr. Mor-
gan's failure to use due care contributed to his 
injury or not.'' 
Another leading case on this subject is the case of 
Schnlt.z ,,_~. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N. W. 972, 33 L. R. A. 
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(N. S.) 403, Ann. Cas. 1912 C. 495 (1911). The court 
stated: 
''Contributory negligence as such is not avail-
able as a defense in a criminal prosecution for a 
homicide caused by the gross and reckless mis-
conduct of the accused, although the decedent's 
behavior is admissible in evidence, and may have 
a material bearing upon the question of the 
defendant's guilt. If, however, the culpable neg-
ligence of the accused is found to be the cause 
of the decedent's death, the former is responsible 
under the criminal law whether the decedent's 
failure to use due care contributed to the injury 
or not.'' 
It should be noted that in the case of Pe~ople vs. 
Campbell, 237 Mich. 244, 212 N. W. 97, cited by appel-
lant, the conduct of the deceased person was eliminated 
from the case by the court's instruction. The trial 
court instructed the jury that as a matter of law the 
defendant was not guilty of contributory negligence. The 
court held that the negligence of the deceased is only 
material if it bears upon the negligence of the defendant. 
This case holds that the contributory negligence is no 
defense. 
In People vs. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. vV. 400, 
another case cited by appellant, the trial court subinittP<l 
the case to the jury on the bald proposition that if at 
the time the defendant struck the deceased he was 
operating a car in excess of ten miles an hour he \Yn~ 
guilty of manslaughter for there 'vas no doubt that 
defendant's car struck and ran over the deceased and 
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caused her death. It was held that this was reversible 
error. So far as the quotation is concerned on page 36 
of appellant ~s brief there can be no question that the 
conduct of the deceased is relevant and should not be 
eliminated from the case. It is apparent that the con-
duct of the defendant in the case at bar was not elim-
inated. 
In People vs. Hurley, 13 Cal. App. (2) 208, 56 P. (2) 
978, the court was considering only the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in that case to support a 
verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The court in deter-
mining whether or not the defendant's conduct was 
reckless took into consideration the conduct of the de-
ceased. This case and State vs. Sisneros, 42 N. M. 500, 
82 Pac. (2) 274, merely stand for the proposition that 
the jury should take into consideration the conduct of 
the deceased in determining the question of proximate 
causation and also on the question of the negligence 
of the defendant. The other cases cited by counsel for 
appellant are to the same effect. 
We will take up these requested instructions in the 
order in which they appear in appellant's brief. The 
first one is Requested Instruction No. 15. The first 
sentence is "you are instructed that a driver may 
presume that others in the road will conduct themselves 
in a lawful manner." We do not believe that the fore-
going statement is a proper one to place in an instruction 
to the jury. See State vs. Campbell, supra. The balance 
of this instruction is to the effect that if Kanon was 
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riding his bicycle- in an unlawful manner and it was 
because of his so riding in an unlawful manner that the 
defendant failed to see him, then the defendant did not 
act unlawfully in failing to yield to Kanon. We believe 
this instruction too general in not informing the jury 
what unlawful conduct of the deceased would bring about 
such a result. 
In Blackford vs. Kaplan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N. E. 
(2) 522 (1939), the trial court had refused to give the 
following requested instruction: 
"You are instructed that if you find that the 
defendant in approaching or entering the inter-
section where the collision in this c'ase took place 
was not proceeding in a la vvful manner, he there-
fore did not enjoy any preferential status or 
privilege over the driver of the other car which 
the statute of Ohio might have otherwise given 
him.'' 
It was held that the request was objectionable be-
cause it did not in any way explain what act would be 
unlawful and work a forfeiture. The court pointed out 
that it should not be left to the jury to determine what 
was or what was not unlawful. In this Blackford case 
a requested instruction similar to the first sentence of 
Requested Instruction No. 15 was held to be properly 
refused. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 'v~uld 
have been instructing the jury as to the contents of a 
Salt Lake City ordinance to the effect that hiescles 
upon a city street should drive as closely as practicable 
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to the right hand edge or curb of the street. Defen-
dant's Requested Instruction No. 21 was that if Kanon 
was not following as closely to the right hand side of 
the street as practicable then the jury should find that 
he did not have the right of way. It is submitted that 
there was no evidence that would justify either of these 
last two requested instructions. The only evidence was 
to the effect that Kanon was as close to the right hand 
curb as \Yas practicable as long as there was a curb 
where he was riding. He certainly did not make a right 
hand turn to follow the curb line as he entered the 
intersection of Second West Street and Ninth South, 
but we do not believe that these ordinances and statutes 
required such conduct. 
Requested Instructions No. 12, 13 and 14 relate to 
the failure of Kanon to have a light on his bicycle. 
These instructions tell the jury that the law requires a 
lighted lamp on a bicycle and that if Kanon was riding 
without a lighted lamp it was unlawful and if found to 
be the proximate cause of his death the defendant should 
be acquitted, that the failure to have a light should be 
considered in connection with all other matters pertain-
ing to the accident. We submit that the contents and 
subject matter of the requested instructions No. 12 to 
l.f were sufficiently presented to the jury by the in-
structions given. The conduct of Kanon was in no way 
elilninated from the case. 
In Instruction No. 7 A the court specifically in-
structe(l the jury that they should consider the conduct 
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of Kanon together with all the other facts and circum-
stances surrounding the accident and that if his conduct 
was the sole proximate cause of his death then the 
defendant should be acquitted. The question in this 
case was whether or not the reckless conduct of the 
defendant caused the death. If it in any way contributed 
to the death of Kanon then the defendant is guilty of 
the crime of Involuntary Manslaughter. By Instruction 
No. 6 the jury was required, before they could return 
a verdict of guilty, to find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the conduct of the defendant caused the death. The 
jury found the defendant guilty and of necessity found 
that it was the defendant's conduct which caused the 
death. Such finding, of course, is also a finding that the 
conduct of the deceased Kanon was not the sole proxi-
mate cause of his own death. 
Based upon similar reasoning courts have held that 
it is not necessary to instruct the jury on unavoidable 
accident. In other words, if a jury is required to find 
that the reckless conduct of an accused caused the death 
before returning a verdict of guilty, then when they 
do return a verdict of guilty they have, of necessity, 
excluded the existence of unavoidable accident in the 
case. See State vs. Richardson, 216 Iowa 809, 249 N. vY. 
211 (1933); Bowen vs. State, 100 Ark. 232, 140 S. \Y. 
28 (1911); State vs. Murphy, 324 ~f o. 183, 23 S. W. (2) 
136 (1929). 
In State vs. Richardson, supra, the court stated : 
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''The omission of any specific reference there-
in (instructions) to the so-called theory of the 
defendant that the unfortunate death of the youth 
was due to unavoidable accident and not to crim-
inal negligence is fully, in effect, covered by the 
instruction. The jury 'vas clearly told that to 
justify a conviction it was incumbent upon the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant at the time was operating his auto-
mobile in a careless, heedless and negligent n1an-
ner in willful or wanton disregard of the safety 
of others. 
Further the court told the jury that to justify 
a conviction it was incumbent upon the state 
to also prove that the defendant was guilty of 
criminal negligence in the manner in which and 
the speed at which he drove his car. This language 
clearly eliminated the possibility of a conviction 
if the act charged was the result of unavoidable 
accident. The jury could not, upon any theory 
of fair reasoning, have believed that the defen-
dant was free from criminal negligence and have 
returned a verdict of guilty. The jury must have 
understood that unavoidable accident possesses 
none of the elements of criminal negligence or of 
willfulness, heedlessness and wantonness. The 
point here urged by appellant is also without 
substantial merit.'' 
Following the reasoning of these cases, the jury 
could not have believed that the conduct of Kanon was 
the sole proximate cause of his own death where it 
returned a verdict of guilty and in so doing was required 
to find that the conduct of the defendant caused the 
death. 
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In People vs. Marconi, 118 Cal. App. 683, 5 P. (2) 
974 (1931) the court stated: 
''The requested instruction is faulty in that it 
could be understood as conveying the idea that 
contributory negligence is a defense, which it is 
not, People vs. McKee 80 Cal. App. 200, 251 P. 
675; People vs. Leutholtz 102 Cal. App. 493, 283 
P. 292, Note in 67 A. L. R. 922. * * * * The 
court did admonish the jury that the defendant 
was not responsible unless the death was caused 
by his own act or omission, thus more correctly 
covering the point appellant sought to cover.'' 
In People vs. Pociask, 14 Cal. (2) 679, 96 P. (2) 
788 (1939) it was held that an instruction, that the 
negligence of deceased was no defense, that such negli-
gence would exonerate only if it was the sole proximate 
cause of the accident but that the defendant was not 
exonerated if the jury found that he was guilty of neg-
ligence which proximately contributed to the injuries, 
correctly covered the law on the subject of the deceased's 
conduct. To the same effect see State vs. Phelps, 153 
Kan. 337, 110 P. (2) 755 (1941). 
In State vs. Graff, (Iowa) 290 N. W. 97 (1940) the 
following instruction was held to correctly state the law: 
"You are instructed that the negligent or 
careless act of the deceased, if any, or of persons 
other than defendant, if any, that might have 
contributed to the death of said deceased, ·will 
not relieve the defendant of criminal responsi-
bility if the death of said deceased was naturally 
and proximately caused by the doing of the dP-
fendant of an unlawful net or acts as herein-
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before defined in such a manner as to show a 
wanton or reckless disregard and indifference 
to the safety of others 'vho might be reasonably 
expected to be injured thereby.'' 
In State rs. Wilbanks, 168 La. 861, 123 So. 600 
(1929) it 'vas held that there was no error in refusing 
the following requested instructions : 
"(1) That it is unlawful for an automobile 
to operate upon the public roads without lights; 
and that it is also a violation of the law for a 
horse-drawn vehicle to operate upon any of the 
roads etc., without a light that can be seen 500 
feet away. (2) That if you find that the failure 
to have lights on the buggy was the cause of 
the accident, or if you find that if the buggy had 
lights on it the accident would not have occurred 
you must acquit.'' 
In that case the defendant's automobile ran into 
a buggy. The defendant's automobile was being driven 
at night without lights. 
In Pratt vs. State, (Ala. App.) 171 So. 393 (1936) 
the defendant requested an instruction that if the jury 
had a reasonable doubt as to whether the deceased was 
guilty of negligence which proximately caused his death 
that it must acquit. The court held that contributory 
negligence is no defense and that the request was proper-
ly refused. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 16 is an 
abstract instruction. It is not in any way made applic-
able to the case at bar. Is it applicable to the defendant's 
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negligence or to the question of proximate cause~ 'Ve 
submit that a general and abstract instruction such as 
this could not in any way aid the jury in their delibera-
tion and its refusal was not error. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 10 was prop-
erly refused. The only persons involved in the accident 
were the defendant and Kanon. Just why a general 
instruction of this kind should be given is not evident. 
The law with relation to proximate cause was fully set 
out in the instructions given. The instructions properly 
limited the deliberations of the jury on the question of 
proximate causation to the proposition of whether the 
conduct of the defendant or that of Kanon caused the 
death. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 17 is similar 
to No. 16, above mentioned, and for the same reasons 
the trial court properly refused to give such request. 
Defendant's Requested Instructions No. 18 and 19 
relate to the claimed failure of Kanon to keep as close 
to the right hand curb or edge of the highway. There 
was no evidence that he did not so drive his bicyclP 
and hence these requests were properly refused. 
We submit that the jury was clearly instructed 
concerning all of the law applicable to the issues of the 
case at bar. In Instruction No. 6 the jury was clearly 
told that before it could convict the defendant it n1u~t 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \vhile 
operating his automobile violated one of the statutes set 
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forth in Instruction No. 5, that his conduct in so doing 
was reckless or evinced a marked disregard for the 
safety of others and that his said conduct was the 
proximate cause of the collision between his automobile 
and Kanon. In Instruction No. 7 the jury were particu-
larly instructed that if it believed that the acts or con-
duct of the defendant in no way proximately caused 
the collision of his automobile and Kanon and the in-
juries to Kanon then it must return a verdict of not 
guilty. By Instruction No. 7-A the jury was told that 
in determining the guilt of the defendant it must take 
into consideration the conduct of Kanon and if it believed 
such conduct to be the sole proximate cause of his death 
then it must acquit the defendant. 
'Ve submit that the foregoing instructions stated the 
law as set forth in the cases cited in this brief and in that 
of appellant. 
(c.) The burden of proof was not cast up,on the 
defendant and no prejudicial error was committed in 
giving Instruction No. 7-A. 
Instruction No. 7 -A set forth the law as follows: 
"You are instructed that in determining whether 
or not the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged in the information you should consider 
the conduct, insofar as there is evidence thereof, 
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the 
accident and at the time of the accident together 
\vitlt all the other facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the accident which have been given in 
evidence. If you believe from all the evidence 
in the case that the sole proximate cause of the 
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InJuries to and the death of the said Sylvester 
Kanon was a result of the acts and conduct of the 
said Sylvester Kanon then you should return a 
verdict of not guilty." 
Appellant took his exception to this instruction as 
follows: 
''Mr. McKay: Comes now the defendant and 
excepts to the Court's instructions to the jury 
as given, as follows: *** Excepts to Instruction 
No. 7 -A, and the whole thereof''. ( R. 134, 135). 
The instruction contains two distinct propositions 
of law: (1) That in determining the guilt of the defen-
dant the jury should consider the conduct of Kanon 
and (2) that if it believed the conduct of Kanon was 
the sole proximate cause of his death then it should 
acquit the defendant. 
There can be no question but that the :first proposi-
tion of law contained in said instruction is correct and 
was properly given. In fact defendant requested that 
that proposition of law be given to the jury. Defen-
dant's Requested Instruction No. 9. 
It is well established that where exception is taken 
to the whole of an instruction containing two or n1ore 
propositions of law and one of said propositions is 
correct then the Supreme Court will not reverse the 
case because one of the other propositions of law 1nay 
be incorrect. An error cannot be predicated upon such 
an exception. State vs. Warner, 79 Ut. 500, 291 P. 307 
(1930); State vs. McNaughton, 92 Ut. 99, 58 P. (2) rl, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
92 Ut. 11±, 66 P. (2) 137 (1936); State vs. Riley, 41 
Ut. 225, 126 P. 29± (1912). 
The reason for this rule is obvious. Exceptions 
are taken to give the trial court an opportunity to cor-
rect any errors made in the instructions. By specifically 
pointing out the latter portion of the instruction it may 
be that the trial court would have been advised of the 
contention of the appellant. It was not pointed out to the 
trial court that it was the second sentence of said In-
struction No. 7 -A that defendant contended was in-
correct. 
We also submit that the wording of this instruction 
was brought about by appellant's counsel. A number 
of requests were made by said counsel on the question 
of the conduct of Kanon. Defendant's Requested In-
struction No. 13 was as follows: 
"You are instructed that if you find that at 
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was 
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a 
lighted lamp, that such riding was unlawful, and 
if you find that his so riding was the proximate 
cause of his death you must find the defendant 
not guilty." 
It will be noted that the wording of this request 
IS identical with the last sentence of Instruction No. 
7 -A. Both are to the effect that if the jury believes 
that the conduct of Kanon was the proximate cause 
of his death then they must find the defendant not 
guilty. Defendant's Requested Instruction Nos. 11, 14, 
1 ;\ 18, 1 f) and 21 are similarly "\VOrded. 
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The trial court in preparing his instructions had 
before him these requests and rather than give these 
particularized requests he stated in one instruction to 
the jury that if it believed the conduct of Kanon was 
the sole proximate cause of his death then it should 
acquit the defendant. This followed the wording of the 
requests made by the defendant. He should not now 
be permitted to say that the trial court erred in follow-
ing the wording of said requests. 
By said Instruction No. 7 -A, the trial court was not 
attempting to fix the burden of proof. The jury ·was 
told on more than one occasion in said instructions that 
the burden was upon the State to prove the elements 
of the offense to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The jury was specifically told that 
it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed an unlawful act evincing a marked dis-
regard for the safety of others which proximately caused 
the death of Kanon before it could convict the defen-
dant. If the jury could not so find it was specifically 
instructed that it could not convict the defendant. 
No. 7 -A states the jury must acquit defendant if it 
believes Kanan's conduct caused the death. This is a 
correct statement of law. C~rtainly it is the lavv that if 
the jury so believed it was duty bound to acquit the 
defendant. The instruction did not go the next step anrl 
state that if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to wheth-
er Kanon 's conduct was the sole proximate cause of llis 
death then defendant should be acquitted. Appellant 
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never did request the court to give an instruction on 
this latter subject ·w·herein this matter would be specifi-
cally called to the jury's attention. The failure to so 
instruct cannot no\v be raised by defendant, he should 
have made such a request. 
The burden of proof was by the instructions placed 
upon the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and this burden was never changed or shifted 
by the instructions. 
In light of the foregoing circumstances, it is sub-
mitted that State vs. Laris, 78 Ut. 183, 2 P. (2) 243, 
cited by appellant, is not in point. 
Appellant claims undue emphasis is laid upon the 
proposition that to justify acquittal the conduct of Kanon 
must be the sole proximate cause of the death. That 
such is the law is clear from the cases cited in appel-
lant's brief and also this brief dealing with the question 
of the contributory negligence of the deceased. 
(d.) There was no error in the trial court's refusal 
to give defendant's Requested Instruction No. 3 defining 
''without due caution or circumspection.'' 
The jury was instructed in accordance with State 
vs. Lingman, s~tpra, that to find the defendant guilty 
of involuntary manslaughter that it must find that the 
conduct of the defendant was reckless or evinced a 
Inarked disregard for the safety of others. (See In-
~truetion No. 6.) 
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In Instruction No. 10 the jury was told that in the 
case at bar there must be a union or joint operation 
of an unlawful act and criminal negligence. Criminal 
negligence is there correctly defined. 
We submit that the jury was very clearly instructed 
on the matter requested by defendant in his request No. 
3 and to have given that request would not have im-
proved the clarity of the instructions. They were clear 
and definite. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt was 
introduced in this case, the instructions to the jury 
correctly stated the law and defined the issues and the 
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant was guilty of the crime charged. No errors were 
committed and the defendant's rights were in no way 
prejudiced but were fully protected. We submit the 
verdict and judgment of the court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
His Deputy 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS, 
District Attorney 
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